The Crescent and the Sword: Islam, the Military, and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan, 1977-1985
Author(s)
Ahmad, Mumtaz
Abstract
Tests the hypothesis that military regimes are inherently unstable due to a lack of political skill, persuasive communication, bargaining, charisma, and an inability to develop new political strategies for survival and legitimacy. The article uses the military regime of General Mohammad Zia-ul Haq of Pakistan as a case study, based on Pakistan’s low political participation, relative economic backwardness, and emerging status in terms of nation building and state formation. Moreover, the military in Pakistan was a highly professional body with sophisticated training institutions and a strong esprit de corps. The focus of the article is on demands for the restoration of democracy, Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflicts, ethnic and regional conflicts, and the responses of the military regime. The military was skillful in its use of the normative symbols of Islam and nationalism, which enabled it to meet political, sectarian, and ethnic challenges, and to achieve a significant degree of political stability and legitimacy.
