This lecture examines the principle of containment as part of American diplomacy during the Cold War. The doctrine of containment, adopted in 1947, held that cooperation with the USSR was not possible since its leaders were ruthlessly seeking world power. This essay explores the long-term development of US attitudes toward European-style diplomacy and domestic politics in post-1945 America, both of which contributed to the exceptional US approach toward the USSR. It traces the beginning of the containment doctrine to George F. Kennan’s 1947 “X” article in Foreign Affairs; through Walter Lippmann’s hard critique of the “X” article and US failure to recognize that the Soviets, while ruthless, were primarily concerned with defense and security; and Winston Churchill’s beliefs that the West was more powerful than the Soviets and that diplomacy would be beneficial. Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower demanded that the USSR end the wars in Korea and Indochina and conclude the Austrian peace treaty, and the USSR had met these conditions by the end of 1955, the US showed little interest in negotiation. The author seeks to understand why US presidents framed their approach to the USSR so narrowly and points out the unique way that US citizens saw their role in the world, and also their security concerns and fear of communism. Although containment eventually worked, many argue that solutions could have been reached with less cost in lives and resources.
