Hausman: Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics: What Are the Questions?
Author(s)
Hausman, Daniel, M.
Abstract
Almost all economists believe that their subject is relevant to policy, yet few have a well-articulated and defensible view of exactly how economics bears on policy or of the extent to which evaluations enter into economic theories themselves. This paper will suggest ways of characterizing the clashing views about whether economics is value neutral, with special attention to a recent paper by Philippe Mongin. Since it is so easy in so many cases to distinguish factual and evaluative claims, it seems as if it ought to be easy to state what it is that distinguishes them. But it is in fact very difficult; with few exceptions philosophers have despaired of stating necessary and sufficient conditions for a statement or proposition to count as factual or as evaluative. Many believe that evaluative claims cannot be investigated and settled by the methods of science; they are not objective or true or false; and they bring in their wake disagreement and relativism. This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that evaluative claims cannot be the subject matter of any science. Once one recognizes that value neutrality involves economists rather than just economics, one must recognize that value neutrality is not only or perhaps even mainly a feature of the propositions contained within economic theory or discussed by economists. Much of the debate concerning whether economics is or ought to be value neutral is concerned with the conduct of economics: for example, with the choice of questions to be investigated, with the use of evidence, with the range of possible policies considered, and so forth. One way in which economics is not value neutral is that economists are influenced by their values in selecting problems to study. Another way in which the conduct of economics is and ought to be governed by values is that it is governed by epistemic values which prohibit making up data, threatening those who disagree, and so forth. Mongin’s most striking theses is that claims such as “individual i prefers x to y” are evaluative. Robbins and other economists have separated off purely positive economics from all evaluative inquiries. Since claims about preference are central to what people take to be positive economics – consider generalizations such as non-satiation or diminishing marginal rates of substitution – Robbins’ proposal, coupled with Mongin’s construal of the distinction between evaluative and non-evaluative propositions would eviscerate economics.
