Egalitarian theories must show why inequalities are bad apart from their consequences with respect to unrelated moral considerations; they must specify which things among all those that may bear on people’s interests ought to be distributed equally, and why; and they must say something about how to integrate concerns about inequalities with other moral concerns such as responsibility, desert, well-being, freedom, and rights. Fundamentalist egalitarians believe that all inequality is bad; others believe that inequalities are bad only because of their consequences. However equality may have more than merely an instrumental connection to some of the ends it serves. There are at least six different egalitarian considerations: to avoid unfairness, to protect impartiality, to sustain self-respect, to show equal respect, to nurture fraternity, and to prevent domination. These considerations lead to concerns about inequalities with respect to crucial resources and basic opportunities, social status, socially provided benefits, burdens and opportunities, socially valued possessions, and political influence.nIf the inequalities that characterize societies were not so large and pervasive, both the differences among egalitarians and the hollowness and implausibility of the intuitive condemnation of inequality itself would be more obvious. Given the rather grim current prospects of egalitarian projects, adjudicating among competing egalitarian positions is unlikely to be of practical importance for a long time to come. But recognizing and emphasizing the range of considerations that drive egalitarians, instead of relying on an untenable intuitive appeal to the intrinsic badness of inequality, should place egalitarianism on a stronger footing. The different ends that equality serves define different objects of egalitarian concern and suggest that egalitarianism is, in fact, a family of concerns rather than a single ethical position.
