Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements
Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements
Author(s)
Barrett, Scott
Abstract
It is well-known that collective well-being can be increased if all countries cooperate in managing shared environmental resources like the climate and ozone layer, but that if this improved situation is attained, every country will earn even higher returns by free-riding on the virtuous behavior of the remaining cooperators. However, the fact that countries can do better when cooperation is sustained has led to the development of international environmental agreements (IEA) which can punish free-riding. The drawback to these IEAs is that they must be self-enforcing. As of now, no country can be forced to join an IEA, and signatories can withdraw from the agreements at any time. This article argues that for IEAs to work, they must make it attractive for countries to want to sign and to want to carry out the terms of their agreements. The author employs concepts from game theory to explore the properties of self-enforcing IEAs, and evaluates their effectiveness.
