Between-Group Communication and Conflict Resolution in Assurance and Chicken Games
Author(s)
Bornstein, Gary; Gilula, Zohar
Abstract
Two types of intergroup conflicts modeled as team games, a game of assurance where the groups’ incentive to compete is purely fear and a game of chicken where the groups’ incentive to compete is purely greed, are examined. The games involved competition between two 3-person groups. The players discussed the game with other in-group members, then met with the members of the out-group for a between-group discussion, and finally had a within-group discussion before deciding individually whether to contribute to their group’s collective effort vis-a-vis the out-group. Results show that all groups playing the assurance game achieved the collectively efficient outcome of zero contribution, whereas groups playing the chicken game maintained a highly inefficient contribution rate of 78%. Communication between groups is highly effective in bringing about a peaceful resolution if the conflict is motivated by fear and useless if the conflict is motivated by greed.
