The distinction between state and stateless societies has long provided the point of departure for anthropologists addressing the problem of egalitarian. The first consists of societies that are unequivocally hierarchical and fall outside our present purview. The second consists of “societies which lack centralized authority,” in which there are “no sharp divisions of rank, status and wealth” and in which “distinctions of rank and status are of minor significance.” Lacking the defining characteristics of hierarchies, these societies are “egalitarian” by default. While distinctions of wealth or privilege exist, and are even criteria “of the qualities or status required for political leadership,” these societies are described as “economically homogenous, equalitarian and segmentary.” The problem here is that inequality is “a common condition of all human societies,” and that one does not study inequality, one argues it. Social equality/inequality belong to both the domains of fact and value, and we still have considerable trouble studying value systems without ourselves becoming embroiled in and identifying with those values.