Making Exceptions without Abandoning the Principle: How a Kantian Might Think about Terrorism
Author(s)
Hill, Thomas E.
Abstract
The basic issue here concerns how (if at all) Kant’s moral theory can come to grips with cases that seem to call for legitimate exceptions to moral prohibitions on killing, lying, promise-keeping and so forth. As the title indicates, the specific moral issue here concerns dealing with terrorist activities that immorally threaten the lives of innocent individuals. Using Kant’s “dignity” principle (the humanity as an end in itself formulation), Hill first argues that a Kantian can admit legitimate exceptions to moral rules that prohibit killing human beings. Hard questions begin to emerge when we consider cases where responses to terrorism involve endangering the lives of innocent people. Even harder questions in which we contemplate the intentional sacrifice of innocent individuals to prevent terrorist activities. Making use of the legislative model associated with the kingdom of ends formulation of the CI, Hill works through these cases.
