Why Social Justice Is Not All That Matters: Justice as the First Virtue
Author(s)
Mitchell, Gregory; Tetlock, Philip E.
Abstract
Political philosophers often employ thought experiments in developing their normative accounts of justice. In contrast, social scientists, as empiricists, tend to be skeptical of thought experiments while, as positivists, they are skeptical of the normative theories of justice that percolate out of thought experiments. Social scientists prefer to employ their own distinctive research tools: laboratory experiments, surveys, and historical and econometric studies to develop descriptive and explanatory accounts of justice. It is hard to persuade philosophers that empirical studies can produce findings about justice per se, due to self-interest contaminants and insufficient conceptual care in formulating public opinion questions and answers, but it may be even harder to persuade social scientists that thought experiments can produce theories of justice uncontaminated by pet theories or cultural biases. This chapter argues for a partial rapprochement, blending thought experiments with laboratory experiments via a technique we call “the hypothetical society paradigm” designed to bring out the inferential advantages of both approaches while minimizing the disadvantages.