As further inquiry into Charles Beitz’s concept of global redistribution, problematic questions arise, such as why nations would only limit themselves to redistributing natural resources versus total economic goods that come from the same global production cooperation. In contrast to Beitz’s belief, the people of a community that participated in the production deserve to keep the rewards since society economically rewards based on arbitrary talents and natural attributes. Even applying Rawl’s theory of legitimate expectations, it is impossible to prove Beitz’s conclusion reached by contradictory assumptions. Secondly, Beitz argues that distributive justice applies when a country has reached a particular threshold of interdependence; however, he gives no definition to the level of threshold, nor does he discuss how to differentiate between the two levels of sufficient and insufficient interdependence. The normative application is impractical, especially for those barely below or above the named threshold; Beitz expounds on this by indicating that those below the threshold hold significantly weaker principals. However, no state or individuals would voluntarily choose morals that are significantly weaker than the global norm. In conclusion, two major theories championed by Beitz are questioned in consideration to the moral impacts of globalization.
