Respect for Nature as an Ultimate Attitude
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Respect for Nature as an Ultimate Attitude
| Author(s) | Taylor, Paul |
|---|---|
| Abstract | This book is essential reading: it is the first book-length treatment of environmental ethics from the perspective of non-anthropocentric “intrinsic” natural value, although Taylor rejects this terminology. Taylor’s position is not new or surprising, since he has been developing it in a series of articles in Environmental Ethics since 1981; nevertheless, this long treatment of the argument adds to the power of his views. The argument grounds a precise set of normative rules regarding the human treatment of nature on a particular axiology of natural value. Taylor’s “theory of environmental ethics” has three components: First, there is a belief system or world view, which he calls the “biocentric outlook on nature.” A moral agent who holds this outlook is informed by current biological and ecological knowledge to conceive of himself and all humanity as members of “Earth’s Community of Life.” From this perspective, all living things are “unified systems of organized activity” that seek their own good. The biocentric outlook also denies human superiority; in theory, at least, it calls for a radical bioegalitarianism. Second, those who hold the biocentric outlook will adopt a particular moral attitude, “Respect for Nature,” which involves valuing the individual natural living entities of the world as having inherent worth, i.e., value not based in any way on human purposes or experiences. Third, then, this attitude of respect for nature requires the formation of definite normative standards or rules for treating the natural wildlife of the world. Among these rules are the rule of nonmaleficence and noninterference. Taylor is attempting to create an environmental ethic modeled after Kant’s respect for persons; the difference is that natural wildlife takes the place of Kantian rational autonomous agents as the foci of moral value. This parallel between environmental ethics and human-centered ethics adds plausibility to the enterprise; yet the symmetry must fail, and does. Although Taylor denies human superiority, he devotes the entire last chapter to a discussion of conflicts between humans and wildlife which pays only lip service to a true bioegalitarianism. For Taylor, it is permissible for humans to sacrifice basic interests of nonhuman wildlife for the sake of nonbasic human interests, when “the human interests involved are so important that rational and factually informed people who have genuine respect for nature are not willing to relinquish the pursuit of those interests even when they take into account the undesirable consequences for wildlife”. So much for the denial of human superiority! Taylor’s theory fails-falls into contradiction-because of its individualism. A moral attitude which respects all living things must degenerate into an exceedingly complex casuistry, usually to the detriment of the natural environment. A successful environmental ethic will find value in nature as a whole, not merely in the individuals that comprise natural systems. |
| IssueNo | |
| Pages | 90-98 |
| Article | Access to Article |
| Source | Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ehtics |
| VolumeNo | |
| PubDate | 1986 |
| ISBN_ISSN | 0691077096 |
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