The Moral Foundation of the Precautionary Principle
Author(s)
Jensen, Karsten Klint
Abstract
The Commission’s recent interpretation of the Precautionary Principle is used as starting point for an analysis of the moral foundation of this principle. The Precautionary Principle is shown to have the ethical status of an amendment to a liberal principle to the effect that a state only may restrict a person’s actions in order to prevent unacceptable harm to others. The amendment allows for restrictions being justified even in cases where there is no conclusive scientific evidence for the risk of harmful effects. However, the liberal tradition has serious problems in determining when a risk of harm is unacceptable. Nevertheless, reasonable liberal arguments in favor of precaution can be based on considerations of irreversible harm and general fear of harm. But it is unclear when these considerations can be overridden. Within the liberal framework, the Commission advocates a so-called proportional version of the Precautionary Principle. This should be clearly distinguished from a welfare-based approach to precaution based on risk-aversive weighing up of expected costs and benefits. However, in the last resort, the Commission does seem to make a covert appeal to such considerations.
