The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Critical Note
Author(s)
Weintraub, Ruth
Abstract
Hausman (1995) has recently provided an argument against identifying well-being with preference satisfaction: 1) The only way of comparing preferences is in terms of the so-called zero-one rule, assigning value 1 (0) to the top (bottom) of everybody’s utility function; 2) The zero-one rule is unfair; 3) If a conception of well-being does not permit one to make ethically acceptable interpersonal comparisons, then that conception of well-being is untenable. I will focus on the first and third theses. Hausman’s arguments for the first, I will suggest (II-III), fail. If the third thesis is correct, I shall then argue (IV), it can be used to undermine other plausible conceptions of the good.
