Structure and Discretion: Missing Links in Representative Bureaucracy
Author(s)
Meier, Kenneth; Bohte, John
Abstract
Bureaucracies are political institutions that are capable of representing the interests of citizens just as legislatures or executives do. Some bureaucracies are designed to be active representatives, to seek out and further the interests of a particular group of people. While most bureaucracies are not designated as active representatives, they still can perform representation functions. The theory of representative bureaucracy links passive representation (that is, similar demographic origins) to active representation. This article extends the literature on representative bureaucracy by focusing on the key element of discretion. First, we will outline briefly the general theory of representative bureaucracy. Second, we will present, and defend as reliable under certain specified conditions, a structural measure of discretion. Third, using a large set of public organizations, we will test the hypothesis that representation will be more effective in organizations that vest greater discretion in their employees. Fourth, we will note the implications of these results for a general theory of organizations.
