How Congress Has Legitimated Latin American Counter Insurgency
Author(s)
Toledo, Roberto
Abstract
Traces US involvement in Latin America since the 1950 NSC-68, which marked a fundamental alteration in US foreign policy by underscoring the importance of military force and open markets in pursuing US hegemony. US legitimation of counterinsurgency began with Cuba following its 1959 revolution; however, as that strategy spread, it was clear that protecting US economic interests via military force alone was ineffective as it spawned corrupt dictatorships throughout the region. At that point, the US Congress advocated a foreign policy of democratization. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration found a new cover for counterinsurgency with the war on drugs, which involved the concept of the narcoguerilla and which found support in the US Congress. While the latter resisted the executive by influencing the structural policy of the war on drugs in terms of how funds are used, calling for more focus on domestic concerns, money has consistently gone to counterinsurgency and right-wing paramilitaries. US involvement in Colombia is looked at in this light. The September 11 attacks have allowed the Bush administration to legitimate the notion of the narcoguerilla more than ever and to provide ideological support to counterterror operations not much different from the problematic counterinsurgency operations of the 1970s. Congress has supports the administration’s use of drug war funds for counterinsurgency. It is then contended that Congressional efforts over the last decade offer drug-war policy a chance of resulting in the kind of regional stability required for US hegemonic consolidation with internal Latin American security forces controlling populations marginalized by free-market policies.
