The Role of Reflexive Trust in Modernizing Public Administrations
Author(s)
Tucker, Andrew
Abstract
It has been a mainstay of administrative modernization theory that improved public service efficiency and financial accountability produces the useful by-product of trust in governmental institutions. But that trust appears to be ever more elusive. Various factors have been identified as significant to declining trust; for example, levels of information provided to the service user, quality of management, and openness in handling mistakes. In this contribution, I build on quantitative data taken from a March 2003 mass survey of British citizens to define “reflexive trust” as a testable hypothesis that explains why the administrative modernization agenda has contributed to lower levels of trust in government. “Reflexive trust” describes citizens’ reaction to the accountability confusion of decentralized mixed-economy service provision. As British New Public Management reforms have made service providers more accountable, so service users have learned to “play the game.” Instead of simply trusting or distrusting decentralized providers to perform their duties, citizens are developing game-playing skills to bargain, conspire against, and deceive these agencies of national government. Seen in this light, administrative modernization produces the unintended consequence of challenging democratic leadership.
