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“The Household Economy and Caring Labor” by Neva R. Goodwin

At the heart of the issues to be taken up here is a tension between the work that women do through the market, for pay, and the kinds of unpaid work that women have traditionally done outside of the market. There are three leading, legitimate, and often conflicting goals regarding the relationship between women's market and non-market work: (1)The goal of equalizing female and male access to market earnings; (2)The goal of ensuring that the important parts of the work traditionally assigned to women will continue to be done, somehow, by someone; (3) The goal of fairness in the overall distribution of work of all types.

Goal (1) was for long regarded as a purely feminist agenda. Within recent decades, however, it has become accepted by large numbers of both men and women, including many who do not regard themselves as feminists.

With respect to goal (2) we will focus especially on domestic labor. This is the work that makes "home" a place where children are nurtured and socialized, and where both children and adults are physically and psychically nourished and refreshed, enjoy much of what makes life worth living, and develop their potential as individuals and as contributing members of society.

This essay will emphasize the importance of the work done by women that is at present unpaid. In the industrialized world this includes domestic labor as well as an overlapping, but not identical, category of "caring labor." The latter includes all work that meets the needs of relatively helpless groups such as the sick, the indigent, children and the elderly. The quality of this work depends upon human compassion as well as practical assistance. In all societies most of this "caring labor" is traditionally done by women -- whether or not it is done through the market. In developed countries, where much of this work has been marketized, the resulting jobs remain gender-stereotyped and generally receive low status and low pay. The other, better compensated work options now increasingly available to women, as a result of progress in attaining goal #1, raise concerns about women's continued willingness to perform unpaid domestic chores or poorly paid, low status caring labor.

When considering the possibility that the socially critical domestic work is receiving less attention than is desirable, it is important to avoid blaming women, or asking the female half of the human race to make sacrifices to rectify the situation. In the U.S., in particular, the difficulty

of simultaneously achieving the first two goals has set up conditions of cognitive dissonance. While gender equality has gradually been gaining wider acceptance, those individuals who were most likely to draw attention to the conflict between women's domestic roles and their achievement of economic parity were the ones who were committed to maintaining the traditional, inferior status of women. At the same time, many of those who were most committed to equality between the sexes have simply ignored the conflict between goals (1) and (2).

The third goal, fairness, has recently become a focus of concern, in part as a result of ignoring the conflicts between the first two. Even while the issue of fairness is gaining attention, for most people the more urgent concern is still the fear that some of the domestic labor upon which society most critically depends is being neglected. Its urgency and emotional impact can be seen in the questions, *Who Pays For The Kids?* (the title of a book by Nancy Folbre [¹]); or "who'll care for the dependent elderly?" (raised in the article by Allan Meyers summarized here). Many people worry about how (if at all) childcare is being organized; or about the increasing numbers of mentally incompetent people who appear to be without care or a home; or about how our own needs in old age will be taken care of. As an example, the 1995 *Human Development Report* states that "[w]omen's vital social functions for maintaining families and communities ... become only too visible when juvenile delinquency rates rise, the elderly are left to die alone or cultural traditions wither". [²]

Our first step towards grappling with the tensions between the three competing goals will be, in the next section, to situate the household economy and caring labor in a larger context of economic activity.

AN OVERVIEW, WITH COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS

In 1995 the annual *Human Development Report* of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) took gender disparities as its central issue. This is an issue that must begin with definitions and measurements, since so much of women's work has tended not to be included in formal quantifications of economic activity. [³] What is typically left out includes not only women's traditional, domestic roles but also other unpaid activities, of both women and men, in production done for household use, for the benefit of the community, or for exchange in the informal sector. [⁴] Globally, the report found that only slightly more than half of the total time spent on economically productive activities is being reported in the standard System of National Accounts (SNAs) and included in conventional income measures such as GDP. Reviewing a sample of 31 countries, the report summarizes:

Of men's total work time in industrial countries, roughly two-thirds is spent in paid SNA activities and one-third in unpaid non-SNA activities. For women, these shares are reversed. In developing countries, more than three-fourths of men's work is in SNA activities [while developing country women again devote two-thirds of their time to non-SNA work]. So, men receive the lion's share of income and recognition for their economic contribution -- while most of women's work remains unpaid, unrecognized and undervalued. [⁵]

This is a fascinating new area of empirical research; however, the UNDP itself cautions that many measurement problems remain to be resolved before precise, reliable international comparisons can be made. The limited data now available suggest that total work time, per adult, in developing countries is about 20% greater than in industrial countries. The latter, of course, have a larger percentage of their population out of the labor force -- either in school, or retired. (Both of these fractions continue to increase, as schooling is extended later in life, and as life expectancy extends ever farther beyond retirement age.) With respect to two countries with some of the best data on work time, Norway and the UK, the UNDP found that:

- There has been a decrease in total work for the population as a whole as well as for both women and men.
- Men's and women's contributions to total work are becoming more equal...
- There is also a tendency towards equalization of men's and women's contributions to both SNA and non-SNA work, more so for SNA work. [⁶]

That description is what many people would expect to see as the result of economic growth. An optimistic view might hope that such trends will spread to all nations of the world, if they just stay on track with the project of modernization. Among the alternative, more pessimistic views, an interesting one is provided by economist Shirley Burggraf, who focuses on what will happen if women, as well as men, actually behave as they are described in conventional economic theory.

Economic rationality is normally said to consist of an individualistic, selfish, and competitive drive to maximize the satisfaction of personal wants and preferences. Burggraf anticipates that women who enter the competitive arena will have markedly less time for unpaid domestic work as well as for poorly paid caring occupations. In adapting to the prevailing norms, women will undergo attitude changes, becoming less willing to sacrifice opportunities for career advancement and financial security for the sake of children or others who need nurturing care. Burggraf believes that a combination of opportunities, pressures, and cultural belief is already bringing about such changes:

There is an emerging economic actor the world has never seen [before]: a rational, independent and informed female who understands the concept of opportunity cost and who can act accordingly.... Given what the market says about the relative value of doctors, lawyers, managers, engineers, plumbers, and mechanics versus housewives, teachers and social workers, it is a safe prediction that as women increasingly exercise their choices with the same kind of economic rationality that many men do less and less time and talent will be invested in society's caretaking functions. [⁷]

Should we be looking forward to a world in which the male work profile increasing looks like the female? Such a world has been made possible by rising labor productivity. (That, in turn, has a complex relationship with a more troublesome factor: unemployment). Or should we, rather, be fearing a world in which women compete in careers designed by and for men, and no one is left to take care of the children, the elderly, and the quality of domestic life? In

considering these issues we will look, in the next section, at the question of how women divide their time between paid and unpaid work.

WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

Lourdes Benaria discusses global changes in women's labor force participation and in women's work in the home. Her analysis is supportive of the widely held impression that modernization implies an increase in the hours of work that women offer through the labor market. However the details, and even the direction of the trend, vary by decade and by location, as women resort to what Barbara Lobodzinska refers to as "the old survival techniques" that are called into play in hard times, when "the preservation of the family becomes an undisputed priority for women." (Lobodzinska, in the paper summarized here, p. 520) The difficulty of even knowing the facts is illustrated by Benaria's example of two contrasting figures for the Dominican Republic. The 1981 census reported the labor force participation of rural women in the formal economy as 21%. A 1984 survey, including informal sector activities and subsistence production as well as formal employment, revised this figure to 84%. (Benaria, p. 1553)

Regional diversity shows up clearly when we look at female participation in the paid labor force as a percent of male participation. Ruth Sivard has provided such data for the population aged 15-64 in 1985, when the region that came by far the closest to parity in this respect was Eastern Europe: the labor force participation of women was 90% that of men. [⁸] In the same year in North America the female labor force participation rate was less than 65% that of men; in the Far East it was nearly 60% the male rate; in Western Europe and Oceania less than 55%; in Africa and South Asia around 45%; and in Latin America and the Middle East around 30%.

These generalized figures become more revealing when they are compared with a more detailed look at a single country. Claudia Goldin's book, *Understanding the Gender Gap*, provides an excellent historical portrait of women's participation in the labor market in the United States. [⁹] Goldin refers to a U-shaped process extending across the last two centuries, in which the market activity of adult women declined to a low point (between 1910 and 1920), and then rose again. [¹⁰] In this picture, women (especially those who, out of extreme poverty, would accept very bad working conditions) were drawn out of home production into the paid labor force in the early phase of industrialization. As the process of industrialization continued through the nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries, its benefits begin to be more widely felt in terms of rising income. It then became feasible for more women to assume the roles we may dimly remember from past generation: it was a mark of status and (presumably) a source of comfortable living for family members when the wife could be a full-time home-maker.

The more recent rise of the second arm of the U represents a renewed entrance of women into the labor force in response to a number of factors, including shifts in demand toward the service sector (which employed more women), and technological change. [¹¹] Supply side variables included increased female education and improved workplace conditions that made market work more attractive; in particular, reduced hours made it more feasible for women to combine paid work with domestic responsibilities, at the same time as the latter were reduced by decreased family size. A variety of other factors strengthened women's motivation to earn an income.

These include the rise in divorce, as well as family expectations for material improvement that raced ahead faster than the pay increases of a single earner.

In the early part of this century, the assumption about female workers was that they were young and not yet married. In fact, "three-quarters of all female workers in 1900, and more than one-half in the (nonwar) years prior to 1950, were single." [12] Although public discussion of the social consequences of married women in the labor force began in the 1920s, the actual numbers involved at that time were small. "Even as late as 1940 most young married women exited the labor force on marriage, and only a small minority would return to the labor force."

It was after 1950 that there was an explosion in the labor force participation and attachment of married women in the U.S., increasing by 10 percentage points in each subsequent decade. The proportion of women aged 25 to 34 years old who worked full-time, 50 to 52 weeks a year, went from 39% in 1966 to 55% in 1986. The percentage of mothers with children younger than a year old who were in the labor force went from 32% in 1977 to 52% in 1988. Today, more than 70% of all U.S. mothers are in the labor force. [13] As summarized in a work of the Population Reference Bureau,

A dramatic transformation in labor force expectations of and for women had occurred in a generation. As a nation, we are concerned with the unsettled issues arising from that revolution: What will bolster the institution of marriage as husbands' and wives' role become more similar than dissimilar? Who will properly care for our children if all the adults in the family are in the paid labor force? [14]

Attempts to understand trends through historical comparisons are complicated by dramatic changes in the kinds of activities, or their relative weight, that are included in the category of unpaid domestic work. For nineteenth century Americans, weaving and clothes-making were among the important domestic activities. Within modern homes the former persists only as a rare hobby, and the latter is moving towards a similar status. The sense of loss or threat that lurks behind the second goal laid out in this essay is not based on a wish for homemade clothes. Nevertheless, these comparisons are mentioned because those who are concerned about the performance of essential domestic work often write or speak as though referring to some better "olden time." In the U.S. that image is probably rooted in circumstances special to the first half of this century; it was then crystalized and idealized in 1950s movies and TV shows, just at the time when the real shift began, of married women into the labor force.

UNFAIR BURDENS

The story just told is not a simple one of substituting hours of paid work for hours of unpaid work; at least in part, the effect has been additive. The result is generally longer work hours put in by women. These are the result both of predictable, routine forms of work as well as of episodic demands imposed by illness, other emergencies, and the years in which mothers are caring for young children while also making other economic contributions to the family. This includes the woman who is breast-feeding, preparing infant foods, and carrying a child on her back while working in the fields or walking to fetch water; it also includes the mother who

juggles getting the kids to daycare or extracurricular activities while fitting in the grocery shopping and other domestic obligations around the demands of a nine-to-five (or longer) job.

The latter dual role -- the one most likely to resonate with readers of this book -- probably does not require longer hours of work than the role of the frontier wife and mother, who made many household items, grew and processed much of the family's food, and could purchase few of the educational and other services that we take for granted. This does not mean, however, that it should be accepted as the way things have to be. Indeed, as noted by Lotte Bailyn (summarized here) and others, the Scandinavian countries have shown that it is indeed possible to express society's valuation of caring work by committing a significant proportion of total resources to paying for its performance.

Focusing on the U.S., authors such as Arlie Hochschild, Nancy Folbre and Juliet Schor (all represented in this part) have addressed in various ways the unfair burden of women who carry a disproportionate share of unpaid domestic work along with market employment. Schor notes that even when women are employed they still spend about two-thirds as much time on domestic work as women who do not have market employment; also, that the average amount of time spent on domestic work by the latter has remained virtually unchanged throughout this century -- in spite of the introduction of appliances advertised as time-saving. The implication of her paper is that there are still significant efficiencies to be gained through social and mechanical innovations designed specifically to reduce housework. Arlie Hochschild, by contrast, expresses concern about the introduction into domestic life of a cult of efficiency, in which family time is parcelled out in a Taylorist fashion because parents are experiencing a "time famine," as companies compete for loyalty and time against what she calls "corporate America's local rival -- the family." The "third shift" described by Hochschild is the additional effort now required to control the damage -- especially to children -- that results from the time bind faced by women and men who are working a first shift in a paid job and a second shift at home.

Women who try to have both a career and a domestic life pay a variety of prices. In general, women still face the prejudices and difficulties which are the object of the first goal mentioned in this paper: equality of job opportunities, and equal pay for equal work, are both still hard to achieve. This point will not be much discussed here, as it will be a major issue for the next *Frontiers* volume, on economic power and inequality. In passing, however, we may note the strong correlation between the types of work that women do in the market and the types of work that receive low pay and low status. It has often been noted that when women enter and become predominant in formerly high status professions, the status and pay for those jobs declines. There are also numerous examples of women taking the jobs that are avoided by men because of their lower pay and status. [¹⁵]

A subtler point about the devaluation of women's work is found in Nancy Folbre's article, "Holding Hands at Midnight: The Paradox of Caring Labor," in which she addresses the general topic of caring labor, including those aspects that are performed through the market (such as nursing, community work, or teaching). (Note that this subject is also taken up in the Hochschild summary, "Between the Toe and The Heel", that is in Part VII.) Folbre focuses especially on those predominantly female jobs that have a "caring" component, and examines a variety of

explanations (e.g., neoclassical and institutionalist economic, as well as psychological or anthropological explanations) for this nexus of characteristics. She contrasts two feminist economist positions: (1) that "women must be willing to enter traditionally male occupations and compete more aggressively with men in order to improve their positions" (Folbre, 1995, p. 84), vs. (2) that "an emphasis on rewarding caring has somewhat anti-market implications, simply because the market does not elicit caring." (*Ibid.*, p. 85) She concludes:

Feminism has played an important role in challenging the patriarchal family, helping establish new rights for women and children and demanding anew definition of family commitments that goes beyond traditional, hierarchical and necessarily heterosexual models. How ironic it would be if progress on this front were neutralized by an individualism so extreme that it renders the best of family values obsolete. An economy based purely on the pursuit of self-interest doesn't leave much room for love..." (*Ibid.*, pp. 86-7)

Summaries in this part by Francine Blau and Ronald Ehrenberg as well as Folbre's other summarized paper, "Children as Economic Goods," describe the real cost, in terms of career development, for a woman to being married and having children. [¹⁶] This cost has risen steeply in this century, for a number of reasons. Folbre stresses that in earlier times, women, lacking high-wage alternatives to domestic labor, faced a lower opportunity cost. For both women and men the out-of-pocket cost of raising children was lower because children left the dependency stage earlier, the costs of provisioning and education were lower (these costs have hugely increased with the increasing complexity of society), and children might begin to contribute to the family economy by age 5 or 6. Modern parents, by contrast, continue to provide significant support to their children at least through high school, often through college, and even beyond. In the past children not only provided labor in the parent's business (especially in agricultural societies); they also supplied a home, food, and care for parents who could no longer provide for themselves.

THE COST TO SOCIETY: MARKET EQUALITY VS DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITY

Changing realities in the last area mentioned -- the expectation that children will act as insurance for their parents' old age -- are described in the last paper summarized here, by anthropologist Allan Meyers. Meyers tells of a personnel shortage in long-term care for individuals with disabilities (especially the elderly), noting that "the industrialized countries have come to rely increasingly upon immigrants (documented and undocumented) and refugees, mainly women from developing countries, to meet their dependency needs." (Meyers, p. 49) However, this case rests mainly upon a dramatic growth in dependency (as the population ages and medical advances can increasingly save the lives of those afflicted, by birth or accident, with severe disabilities), and only secondarily upon a reduction in the willingness or ability of developed-country populations to meet those needs. Meyers poses the urgent question: if currently less developed countries pursue the path of modernization, following the demographic trends of the industrialized countries, who will take care of their dependent elderly populations?

On the parameter of child care, a careful time-use study from the early 1970s noted that "female employment reduces the time spent with children by slightly more than one third." [¹⁷] The fear that the necessary domestic work traditionally associated with women will simply not get done

receives some support from demographic trends. A decline in birthrates below replacement level is already evident in a number of western -- and increasingly, also, eastern -- European countries. [18] This is consistent with the "economic woman" argument, that a cost-benefit calculation goes against motherhood.

A recent study by Jonathan Gershuny and John Robinson (summarized here) does not dispute that market work is in conflict with domestic work, but reports more complex findings. The time that women spent on domestic chores (other than childcare) in the U.K. and the U.S. dropped overall between the 1960s and the 1980s, with the timing of sharp drops in each country coinciding with especially rapid increases in paid labor force participation. However, when these authors analyzed separately two groups -- women with, and women without, paid jobs -- they found that in both countries each group has *increased* the time devoted to child care; a finding that is open to a variety of different interpretations.

In general, at least over relatively short time periods (a few decades), and within single countries or fairly homogeneous regions, it appears that paid work is in competition with unpaid work, and reduces the time available for the latter.

PRESCRIPTIONS AND POLICIES

The complex of problems addressed in this essay includes the following facts: there is much important caring work to be done in the world; women who take formal employment are likely to have less time available for unpaid work; and the existing situation in most of the world, in which women carry a dual burden of caring and earning, is inequitable. Even less acceptable is the idea that history should be rolled back, and women should leave the world of paid work. The following is a short list of alternative possible responses.

1) *Socializing the costs of caring labor.* This is what has, in fact, been undertaken in social welfare programs in virtually every modern nation. The question is not whether this is a good idea, but how far to take it. The menu of possibilities includes public support for maternity programs including nutrition, health, and training for motherhood; a vast variety of other kinds of public health programs, relevant to all ages and segments of a given population; nursing homes, home-visiting services, meals-on-wheels, etc.; public child care (day-care, nurseries, etc.); publicly supported education from kindergarten through graduate school; and so on. As noted earlier, this solution has been taken farthest in some northern European countries, where, it could be argued, the conflict between the first and second goals listed at the start of this essay has been virtually eliminated. In Scandinavia and the Netherlands a variety of caring activities are recognized as socially valuable, and a collective decision has been made to allocate significant public resources to paying people to perform these tasks within socialized facilities. As an example of the backwardness of the U.S. in this respect, "[a]ll industrialized countries except the United States provide family allowances based on the number and ages of children to allow mothers to choose to stay home." [19]

2) *Shifting activities out of the family into other social institutions.* This approach may or may not be included under #1, depending on whether or not the alternative institutions are publicly supported. Much of this has already happened in industrialized countries; for example, education is increasingly left to schools, counselling is available from a variety of specialized

professions, and care for the sick can be purchased through nursing homes or other market arrangements. As Meyers points out, the limits of this solution may have already been reached in the area of elderly care, as long as society's valuations of these caring activities remains unchanged. Likewise, if schools are to take on more than their present roles, they will need more personnel, with some different kinds of training, and more funds to attract qualified people into these positions. Many other institutional solutions, as long as they are not socialized (e.g., quality care for individuals born with severe mental or physical disabilities), will remain out of reach for all but the wealthy.

3) *Workplace policies to make it easier for people to fulfil the requirements of both work and home.* This is related to the two previous options, but depends more upon action taken at the firm level, and usually has consequences for the cost of doing business. Decades of experience now make it clear that when such policies are applied to women only they can be a two-edged sword; for example, parental leave, when applied more to women than to men, can provide humane relief from some of the most acute pressures of juggling motherhood and career, but with the unwanted effect of dampening women's career prospects. (This point is brought out in the summaries by Baylin, and by Francine Blau and Ronald Ehrenberg. [²⁰]) Less obviously gender-related policies include employer flexibility with respect to options for part-time work, work performed at home, and similar moves that were described in Part V. As we saw there, while these options can have many advantages they can also help to create a "mommy track" or, sometimes, to shift the balance of power away from the worker, toward the employer.

4) *Privatizing the benefits of caring labor.* As discussed earlier, nearly all of the economic incentives that used to exist for parenting have evaporated. Are there ways of tying some benefits to successful parenting without creating perverse incentives? As an example, some additional retirement bonus might be awarded to the contributing parents of each child who successfully completes high-school. This is a thought-provoking but problematical proposal. [²¹] A less problematical example of privatizing the benefits of caring labor emerges in proposals to subsidize family home-care for the elderly, based on the savings to society over nursing-home or hospital care.

5) *Changes in living design.* Some aspects of domestic labor may still be open to simplification or reduction in time requirements via improved materials, technologies, and social systems (e.g., clothes that don't require ironing, automated shopping and delivery services, etc.). Other aspects might become less of a burden through deeper social change. Suggestions along this line include communitarian living arrangements as suggested, for example, by Hilikka Pietila (summarized here).

6) *Changes in cultural expectations, with special attention to gender roles.* Most proponents of this approach (including a majority of the authors summarized here) stress the desirability of reexamining how males are socialized, to make it more acceptable for men and boys to share in caring labor; this usually includes de-emphasizing aggressive, competitive behavior. A major change of this sort would include a reevaluation of what really matters in life, and what are the deepest sources of pleasure and satisfaction. This possibility might, for example, move some individuals in the direction of the voluntary simplicity movement, where a consciously-directed

reduction in wants reduces the time required to earn a living, and increases the time available for living. If men and women were to share equally in cultural changes of this nature, they would have more freedom to reconsider the individual gains that come from participating in caring labor. An overall increase in "leisure" (i.e., non-paid-work) time would also make it easier to negotiate a fair division, between men and women, of the less appealing aspects of caring labor.

Most of the articles summarized in this part of the volume contain prescriptive comments, with more frequent reference to prescriptions 3 and 6 than to the others; but this is clearly not an either-or matter. Each of the six categories of response appears to have limits in how much it can accomplish; however, synergies among several of them could enlarge their limits. As is so often the case, it seems that any possible effectiveness of each approach is likely to be enhanced if some or all of the others are present.

Overall, examination of the literature in this area is encouraging. It would be good if there were more public debate than now exists in this country regarding the proposed categories of prescription, but there is cause for cautious optimism in the fact that, across a fairly wide political spectrum, none of them appears to be out of bounds for consideration. Regarding the three goals with which we started, substantial progress has been made in putting them all on the table together, in spite of the difficulties in their simultaneous resolution.

Notes

1. Nancy Folbre, *Who Pays for the Kids?* (COMPLETE THE REFERENCE)
2. UNDP, 1995: *Human Development Report* (New York, Oxford University Press); p. 98.
3. The UNDP's definition of "economic activities" was governed by a "third-person rule:" an activity qualifies as economic if it would be possible to hire someone else to do it. For an interesting critique of this rule, see Himmelweit, "The Discovery of 'Unpaid Work'"
4. In a paper summarized here Lourdes Benaria identifies four types of productive work that are largely unrepresented in formal accounts of national wealth: subsistence production, informal paid production, domestic work, and volunteer work. Women play a larger role than men in all of Benaria's categories. The first of them, which includes agriculture as well as provisioning activities such as the collection and transportation of water and fuel, is likely to be the dominant category of unpaid work in rural areas of the Third World. Because of the industrialized world focus of this book, we have not attempted to cover the work issues that are especially related to subsistence production.
5. UNDP, *op. cit.*, p. 88
6. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
7. Shirley P. Burggraf, 1997 *The Feminine Economy & Economic Man: Reviving the Role of Family in the Postindustrial Age* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.), pp. 22-3.
8. Ruth Sivard, *Women, A World Survey*. (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1995). This reflects simply the number of people who had paid jobs. The 1995 UNDP estimates suggest that, if the comparison were made on the basis of hours worked in the formal labor force, women may in fact contribute more than 100% the male average of formal labor hours. Lobodzinska's paper provides a closer look at how these figures should be interpreted, in terms of women's experience and status at work and in the home.
9. Claudia Goldin, 1990, *Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women* (New York, Oxford University Press).
10. For a similar U-shaped curve in other countries, see the summary in Part VII by Nilufer Cagatay and Sule Ozler.
11. Goldin puts forth an interesting thesis on the role of technical change:
As a general proposition, technological advances are accompanied by an increase in the female intensity of an industry or a sector of the economy. Where technological change has been greatest from 1890 to 1980, as measured by total factor productivity increases, women's employment share relative to the average in the economy has increased the most.... Although technological change does not always lead to the replacement of male workers by females, the

instances of men replacing women because of technological change are few compared with those of women replacing men. (Goldin, *op cit.*, p. 94)

12. *Ibid.*, p. 175. The next two quotations are from the same source, pp. 95 and 216.

13. *The Washington Post*, Jan. 26 1998, p. A04; article by Barbara Vobejda. The article notes that, of the children under 5 whose mothers work, 43% are cared for by relatives (including fathers and grandparents); 29% are in organized child-care centers, and 21% are cared for by a babysitter or nanny.

14. Suzanne Bianchi and Daphne Spain, December 1996 "Women, Work, and Family in America" in *Population Bulletin* vol. 51, No. 3 (a publication of the Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C.); p. 3.

15. Cf. *Ibid.*, pps 20-21; also Lobodzinska, summarized here. There is a strong improving trend with respect to these problems: "Between 1980 and 1994, the ratio of women's to men's earnings among full-time, year-round workers, the most commonly used barometer of gender wage inequality, increased from 60 to 72 percent." (Bianchi and Spain, *op. cit.*, p 24.) At the same time, the improvement in the status and pay of jobs open to women -- the approach toward achieving goal #1 (equal work and equal pay) -- is creating the pressures described below on goal #2 (that household and caring work not be neglected).

16. See also Jane Waldfogel, 1995: "The Price of Motherhood: Family Status and Women's Pay in a Young British Cohort" (*Oxford Economic Papers* 47, 584-610).

17. Philip J. Stone, "Child Care in Twelve Countries" in Alexander Szalai, ed., 1972 *The Use of Time: Daily activities of urban and suburban populations in twelve countries* (The Hague: Mouton; publication of the European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in the Social Sciences); p. 263. Note that the reference here is to full-time employment (7-8 hours a day). While the average figure cited here seems to hold over a good many different circumstances, there is more variation in the overall consequences for women's time use as they enter the market. A particularly close analysis was given to a comparison of time use in three cities, in the USA, Yugoslavia and Poland. In the U.S. city studied, unemployed housewives were "relatively speaking, the most privileged as far as amounts of free time were concerned," enjoying almost six hours of non-work time per day -- "about an hour more than the average employed man." In Poland housewives and employed males each had a little less than 5 free hours per day, while in Yugoslavia housewives had just a little more than 3 hours of free time, compared to 4 hours for employed men. The reduction in leisure time for women in the three cities, when they took employment was as follows: in the U.S., 2 hours reduction, to 4 hours leisure time; in Poland 1.5 hours reduction, to 3.5 hours leisure time; and in Yugoslavia 1.5 hours reduction, to 2.5 hours leisure time. In the latter two cases the reduction in leisure time would have been even more dramatic if the researchers had included the women's approximately one hour reduction in sleep time. (*Ibid.*, pps. 270-272)

18. While the total fertility rate in the U.S. has hovered at or just under 2%, most of Europe is considerably below this. The total fertility rate "was lowest in Italy and Spain (1.2) in 1996, with Germany, Greece, Latvia and Romania close behind with an average of 1.3 children. Fertility in many European countries has declined since the 1970s despite policies designed to promote childbearing, including subsidized maternity leave and family allowances for each child." (Bianchi and Spain, *op. cit.*, p 39.)

19. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

20. See also Heike Trappe, 1996, "Work and Family in Women's Lives in the German Democratic Republic" in *Work and Occupations*, ed. (?); Beverly Hills, California; Sage Publications.

21. This is an adaptation of a far more extreme proposal by Shirley Burggraf (*op. cit.*), to make all social security payments to parents dependent upon their children's earnings, while non-parents would be expected to save for their own retirement out of the funds they had not spent on raising children.